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ABSTRACT 
This study estimates a gasoline demand function for Iran using the structural time 
series model over the period 1968-2002 and uses it to estimate the change in social 
welfare for 2003 and 2004 of a higher gasoline price policy.  It is found that short and 
long run demand price elasticities are inelastic, although the response is greater in the 
long run.  Hence, social welfare is estimated to fall because of the higher gasoline price 
(ceteris paribus).  However, allowing all variables in the model to change, social welfare 
is estimated to increase since the changes in the other variables more than compensate 
for the negative effects of the policy.   
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Gasoline Demand, Pricing Policy and Social Welfare in Iran 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Since 1982, Iranian gasoline consumption has increased faster than production.  
This has created disequilibrium in the gasoline market due mainly to the low price of 
gasoline which is determined by the government.  If the price was not regulated, it is 
likely that the domestic price paid by Iranian consumers would be higher given prevailing 
world oil market prices.  In order to cover the excess demand, gasoline is imported by the 
Iranian government at the world price and sold along with domestic production at a lower 
price.  Consequently, government expenditure increased and potential revenue, which 
would have been obtained by more exports of crude oil and petroleum, decreased.  In 
addition, the higher consumption of gasoline has contributed to increased environmental 
pollution1. 
Up until 2004, the Iranian government employed a policy of gradually increasing 
the gasoline price to eliminate the hidden subsidy and the perceived negative effects of 
the low price as outlined above.2  This policy was employed to prevent the high negative 
effects of a sudden increase in the gasoline price on the Iranian inflation rate.  Figure 1 
shows the nominal and real gasoline price in Iran over the 1968 -2002 period.  It can be 
seen that the nominal price in the domestic market was relatively constant until 1994 but 
from 1995 increased rapidly because of government policy.  Whereas the real price 
                                                 
1
 Although pollution is an important factor, it is beyond the scope of the current analysis and not considered 
here. 
2
 For example see MPO (2000). 
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decreased until 1979 followed by a sharp hike in 1980 followed by a decrease until 1995 
when the real price started to increase slightly until the end of the period. 
{Figure 1 about here} 
Figure 2 illustrates the trends in Iranian gasoline production and consumption and 
shows that both have generally increased over the 1968 – 2002 period, however, until 
1981 production exceeded consumption whereas since 1981 consumption exceeded 
production (hence the gap was filled by imports which have grown over this latter 
period).  This is further illustrated in Figure 3 which gives the ratio of production to 
consumption over the period which decreased from 3.25 in 1968 to 0.92 in 1981 and 0.76 
in 2002; perhaps suggesting that an increase in the price would help stem these 
developments. 
{Figures 2 and 3 about here} 
However any price increase will have an impact on the social welfare of the 
country, hence an understanding of the size of the impacts is important.  Moreover, this 
should be considered along with other aspects of the policy in order to achieve the best 
results.  Therefore, the Iranian gasoline pricing policy is evaluated by estimating its effect 
on social welfare.  This is achieved by estimating an Iranian gasoline demand function 
using annual time series data over the period 1968 to 2002.  The structural time series 
model is employed for estimation, given it allows for the estimation of a stochastic 
underlying trend, since this is seen as important when estimating the gasoline price 
elasticities of demand.  In this framework, a deterministic trend is a special restricted case 
and only accepted if is supported by the related tests in estimation. 
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Table 1 presents some previous gasoline demand studies for Iran.  All the studies 
cited used annual data over a range of estimation periods and used Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) other than Sohfi and Paknejad (2001) who used instrumental variables 
(IV) with an Error Correction Model (ECM).  All cited studies ignore the issue of 
technical progress and underlying trends consequently none included a time trend to 
capture this effect.  Generally the cited studies suggest that Iranian Gasoline demand is 
inelastic with respect to price in the short and long run but larger in the long run (except 
for Gharbali Moghaddam and Eghdami, 2002 that do not include an income or activity 
variable in their model3).  The estimated income elasticity for most of the cited studies is 
inelastic in the short run but greater, and in some cases, elastic in the long run. 
{Table 1 about here} 
No previous studies, as far as is known, have attempted to estimate the welfare 
effects of any policy change in the Iranian gasoline market.  The next section of the 
paper, therefore, outlines the theoretical model for gasoline demand and supply in Iran.  
Section 3 introduces the empirical methodology used to estimate the demand function 
and calculate the effects on welfare with the results given in Section 4 and a summary 
and conclusion in Section 5. 
 
 
                                                 
3
 Hence their results, not surprisingly, are quite different from the others. 
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1. THEORETICAL MODEL 
Demand 
Following Weyman-Jones (1986), a representative demand function for 
gasoline can be derived by a staged procedure of utility maximization subject to the 
budget constraint.  In the first stage, dividing goods into two groups (energy and non-
energy), the consumer maximizes utility (U') subject to the budget constraint for these 
two goods, so that demand, and therefore expenditure, on energy goods are 
determined as follows: 
Stage 1: 
Max ),( ne QQU ′  (1) 
s.t YQPQP nnee =+ ..  (2) 
giving ),,( YPPQQ nedede =  (3) 
and deee QPY .=  (4) 
where Q, P, Y, and Qd represent quantity, price, income/expenditure, and demand 
respectively and the subscripts e and n represent energy and non-energy goods 
respectively.  
In the second stage, dividing energy goods into four groups (petroleum, gas, 
electricity and coal) the consumer maximizes utility (U'') subject to the budget 
constraint for these four goods, so that demand and therefore expenditure on 
petroleum are determined as follows: 
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Stage 2: 
Max ),,,( celgape QQQQU ′′  (5) 
s.t. eccelelgagapepe YQPQPaQPQP =+++ ....  (6) 
giving ),,,,( ecelgapedpedpe YPPPPQQ =  (7) 
and dpepepe QPY .=  (8) 
Where U'' represents stage 2 utility and the subscripts pe, ga, el and c represent 
petroleum, gas, electricity and coal respectively.  
In the third stage, dividing petroleum into three goods (gasoline, kerosene and 
diesel) the consumer maximizes utility (U''') subject to the budget constraint for these 
three goods, so that demand and therefore expenditure on gasoline are determined as 
follows: 
Stage 3: 
Max ),,( dkg QQQU ′′′  (9) 
s.t. peddkkgg YQPQPQP =++ ...  (10) 
giving ),,,( pedkgdgdg YPPPQQ =  (11) 
where the subscripts g, k and d represent gasoline, kerosene and diesel respectively.4 
From the above derivation, it can be seen that in general the demand for 
gasoline is expected to be a function of the gasoline price, the kerosene price, the 
diesel price and the expenditure on petroleum products.  However, in the estimation 
                                                 
4
 Given the nature of the application of fuel oil which is consumed by the industrial sector as an input, this 
petroleum product is ignored in the third stage of the utility maximization procedure; implicitly assuming 
that the demand for fuel oil is derived by cost minimization subject to a production constraint by producers.  
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detailed below GDP replaces expenditure on petroleum products given the analysis is 
for whole economy aggregate gasoline consumption, and the lack of data for 
petroleum product expenditure.  In addition the price of kerosene is ignored in the 
estimation since kerosene is primarily used for heating and hence neither a substitute 
nor a complement for gasoline. 
 
Supply 
The Iranian petroleum products industry, including gasoline, is run by a 
number of (non-profit maximising) public refinery companies that administer the 
price of gasoline set each year by the government.  In addition, the Iranian 
government determines the amount of crude oil each year that is used by the 
refineries in order for them to produce petroleum products, including gasoline.  
Therefore, annual Iranian gasoline supply is assumed to be vertical at the level of 
production and hence perfectly price inelastic as follows: 
s
gt
s
gt QQ =  (12) 
where sgtQ  and sgtQ  represent gasoline supply and gasoline production respectively.  
Hence, although the supply function is vertical, it is likely to shift over time due to 
changes in the amount of crude oil input into the refining process (as set by the 
government); in addition to other exogenous factors.5  
 
                                                 
5
 Amongst other things, this could include such exogenous factors as changes in technology, expansion of 
the size of plant, efficiency improvements, outages due to maintenance, etc. 
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2. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
Demand  
To estimate the gasoline demand function for Iran, the structural time series 
model (STSM) is applied (see Harvey 1989).  This allows for the estimation of a 
stochastic rather than a deterministic underlying trend, which arguably is important 
when estimating the gasoline price elasticity of demand as discussed by Hunt and 
Ninomiya (2003).  In addition to technological advance, the underlying trends could 
be strongly affected by changes in tastes, consumer preferences, socio-demographic 
and geographic factors which are not easily measured, and therefore difficult to obtain 
any suitable data.  Hence the inclusion of the stochastic trend in the following long 
run gasoline demand model: 
ttt
d
gq εµ +′+= δzt  ),0(~ 2εσε NIDt  (13) 
where 
t
d
gq  is the gasoline consumption (in natural logs), tµ  represents the trend 
component, tz  is a 1×k  vector of other independent variables - including the real 
gasoline price (rpg) and GDP (y) both in natural logs - δ  is a 1×k  vector of unknown 
parameters and tε  is a random white noise disturbance term. 
The trend component tµ  is assumed to have the following stochastic process: 
tttt ηβµµ ++= −− 11  ),0(~ 2ηση NIDt  (14) 
ttt ξββ += −1  ),0(~ 2ξσξ NIDt  (15) 
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so, the trend includes a level and a slope which is β .  The nature of the trend depends 
on the variances 2ησ  and
2
ξσ , known as hyperparameters.  At the extreme, if they are 
both equal to zero, the model will collapse to the conventional model with a 
deterministic linear trend as follows: 
tt
d
g tq εβα +′++= δz t  (16) 
 
The Maximum Likelihood (ML) procedure in conjunction with the Kalman 
filter is used to estimate an Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) form of equation 
(13)6 using the software STAMP6.3 (Koopmans, et al., 2000).  This general function 
is considered initially and the preferred model found by testing down from the over 
parameterised ARDL model subject to a battery of diagnostic tests.7 
 
Welfare 
The estimated demand function along with the assumed vertical supply curve 
are used to calculate the welfare changes of a gasoline price increase at two levels.  At 
the first level, the ‘pure price effect’ of a higher gasoline price on welfare in 2003-
2004, holding other variables (such as GDP, etc.) constant is calculated as follows:  
                                                 
6
 Starting with lags of three years. 
7
 For further details refer to Hunt and Ninomiya (2003). The cointegration approach is not considered here 
since it only allows for a deterministic trend and not a stochastic trend; whereas, the STSM can 
accommodate a stochastic trend which is consistent with the interpretation of underlying trends of Hunt and 
Ninomiya (2003).  Therefore, a deterministic time trend is a limiting case of the STSM, which is admissible 
only when statistically accepted by data.  
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g
g
g
p
p
p
g
d
g dPZQCS ∫−=∆
04
03
),( 03,031 µ  (17) 
)1)(()()( 03030403030303030304104
1 tPPQQPtPQPtPPS ggsgsgggsggg −−=−−−=∆  (18) 
111 PSCSSS ∆+∆=∆  (19) 
where CS, PS and SS represent consumer surplus, producer surplus and social surplus 
respectively. 8  Also, dgQ and sgQ  denote gasoline demand and supply respectively.  Pg 
is the nominal gasoline price and t is the gasoline tax rate.  Subscripts 03 and 04 
indicate the values in years 2003 and 2004 respectively and superscript 1 denotes the 
first level, ‘pure price effect’.  
At the second level, the ‘overall effect’ is calculated.  In addition to the change 
in the gasoline price, the other variables that drive demand (held constant for the first 
level such as GDP, CPI, the underlying trend, etc.) are also allowed to vary thus 
allowing the demand curve to shift between the two years.  Furthermore, the vertical 
supply curve, fixed in the first level, also shifts out slightly primarily due to changes 
in the level of crude oil used by the public refineries.9  Therefore the second level 
‘overall effect’ calculates the changes in welfare resulting from the movement along 
the gasoline demand curve (the ‘pure price effect’) plus changes in welfare resulting 
from a shift in the demand curve and the vertical supply curve; thus giving an 
estimate of the change in total welfare between the two years 2003 and 2004.  
                                                 
8
 Strictly speaking, the correct measures of consumer welfare change are compensating variation (CV) or 
equivalent variation (EV).  However, the differences between consumer surplus, CV and EV measures are 
very small hence the consumer surplus measure is applied here. 
9
 Although part of the shift in the supply curve might have occurred due to some of the exogenous factors 
identified in footnote 5 above.  
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Consequently, the change in consumer surplus from allowing for a shift in the 
demand curve is as follows: 
∫∫ −
Og
g
gg
Ng
g
p
p
pg
d
gp
p
p
g
d
g dPZQdPZQ
0404
),,(),,( 03030404 µµ  (20) 
and the change in producer surplus after also allowing for a shift in the vertical supply 
curve is as follows: 
)1()())(( 04040304040404040304 tPQQPtPPQQ g
s
g
s
gggg
s
g
s
g −−=−−  (21) 
where PgN, PgO are the prices which the quantity of demand is equal to zero after and 
before a shift in demand curve respectively.  Other definitions are the same as above.  
Adding equations (20) and (21) to equations (17) and (18) respectively, the overall 
welfare changes are calculated as follows: 
∫∫∫ −+−=∆
Og
g
gg
Ng
g
g
g
g
p
p
pg
d
gp
p
p
g
d
g
p
p
pg
d
g dPZQdPZQdPZQCS
0404
04
03
),,(),,(),,( 0303040403032 µµµ  (22) 
)1()1( 030303040404
2 tPQtPQPS gsggsg −−−=∆  (23) 
222 PSCSSS ∆+∆=∆
 (24) 
where superscript 2 denotes the second level, ‘overall effect’. 
 
Data 
The initial general ARDL demand relationship as outlined above is estimated 
using data over the period 1968 to 2002 and the welfare calculations are undertaken 
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for the period 2003 to 2004.  The data used are annual time series of gasoline 
consumption in natural logarithms for the dependent variable ( dgq ), and the real GDP, 
real gasoline price, real diesel price, population, and the stock of vehicles all in 
natural logarithms as the independent variables (z'). 
Data were collected from the National Iranian Oil Refining and Distribution 
Company (NIORDC), the Ministry of Energy, the Management and Planning 
Organization (MPO), the Central Bank of Iran, the Ministry of Industry and the 
Islamic Republic of Iran Police.  Population used is the prediction of the MPO for the 
3rd economic, social and cultural development plan.  The stock of vehicles is 
approximately calculated as the production of gasoline using vehicles plus imported 
gasoline using vehicles each year minus or plus the number of such vehicles 
registered by the police in the year 2000.  Nominal gasoline prices are deflated by the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI).  
 
 
3. RESULTS 
Demand 
The model was estimated for gasoline demand for Iran for the period 1968 to 
1998; saving 4 years for post sample prediction tests.  By testing down from a general 
ARDL version of equation (13) with a three year lag a suitable restricted model for 
Iranian gasoline demand was selected by eliminating insignificant variables in order 
to determine the number of lags, included variables and the nature of the trend, but 
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ensuring a range of diagnostics tests were passed.  The preferred equation is given in 
Table 2 which shows that the model fits the data well passing all diagnostic tests 
indicating that there are no problems with residual serial correlation, non-normality or 
heteroscedasticity.  Furthermore, the auxiliary residuals are found to be normal and 
the model is stable as indicated by the post sample predictive failure tests.10 
The estimated short run and long run price elasticities are -0.19 and -0.74 
respectively and the estimated short run and long run income elasticities are 0.32 and 
1.25 respectively.  Hence, estimated long run elasticities are greater than the short run 
(in absolute terms) however with respect to the price, gasoline demand is inelastic in 
both the short- and the long run whereas with respect to income demand is inelastic in 
the short run but elastic in the long run.  Furthermore, the results are consistent with 
the previous studies for Iran highlighted in Table 1, despite the different estimation 
method. 
The Likelihood Ratio (LR) test in Table 2 implies that imposing the restriction 
of a deterministic trend (where both the level and the slope in the trend are fixed) is 
rejected.  Therefore, the trend in the preferred model, presented in Figure 411, is the 
local level with drift specification where the trend is stochastic in the level but fixed 
in the slope.  It can be seen that the underlying trend is clearly non-linear, generally 
increasing between 1968 to 1985 followed by a substantial decline between 1985 to 
1995 before increasing again after 1995.  This implies that from 1985 to 1995 
                                                 
10
 Following Harvey and Koopman, (1992) intervention dummies were added for significant outliers in the 
years 1983 and 1986 to ensure all diagnostic tests were passed, but their inclusion has no discernable effect 
on the estimated coefficients. 
11
 The trend for the estimated equation over the whole period, up to and including 2002 (given in the final 
column of Table 2) is actually presented given this equation is the one used for the welfare calculations 
later in the paper. 
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gasoline intensity in Iran was generally falling, hence shifting the demand curve to 
the left (ceteris paribus), in contrast to the rest of the estimation period.  In particular, 
since 1995 where the underlying trend suggests that intensity fell quite fast with the 
gasoline demand curve shifting outwards (ceteris paribus).  One possible explanation 
for this is that over this period there was a fast increase in car production and 
purchases with convenient buying conditions for customers such as payment 
instalments and affordable car prices for consumers. 
{Table 2 about here} 
{Figure 4 about here} 
Focussing on the final preferred specification in Table 2 it can be seen that the 
only lag significant, and hence retained, is the first lag of gasoline consumption.  The 
diesel price (as a substitute for gasoline) was not significant in the model and so was 
omitted.  When either the stock of vehicles or population or both were added to the 
model, the LR test implied that the restriction of a deterministic trend could not be 
rejected.  Therefore, the equation including either stock of vehicles or population or 
both were estimated with a fixed level and fixed slope (i.e. the conventional 
deterministic model), but these gave unreasonable price and income elasticity 
estimates; both elasticities being regarded as too small in the long run when the stock 
of vehicles and/or population were added and the long run income elasticity regarded 
as too high when just population was added.  In addition, a general per capita demand 
function for gasoline consumption was also estimated with the preferred equation 
giving results very similar to the total demand function for gasoline consumption, 
with similar values of coefficients – highlighting the robustness of the results. 
 Page 15 of 29 
The final column of Table 2 gives the results from re-estimating the preferred 
model over the whole sample period 1968 to 2002.  It can be seen that the results are 
extremely similar, again highlighting the robustness of the results.  
 
Welfare 
In order to calculate the welfare changes the estimated gasoline demand 
function for the full sample period, given in Table 2, was used to calculate the welfare 
changes at two levels as explained in section 3 above. 
The results for the ‘pure price effect’ with the change in consumer and 
producer surplus expressed as shares of the total social welfare change are given in 
Table 3.  This shows that the change in consumer welfare was found to be negative 
and relatively large when compared to positive, but relatively smaller, producer 
welfare component. 
In order to calculate the ‘overall effect’ the price for which the quantity of 
demand would be equal to zero is needed, before and after the shift in the demand 
curve i.e.
OgNg
PP ,
 
in equation (22).  Given, the demand curve is estimated in linear-
logarithm form, it is a non-linear multiplicative function after taking anti-logarithms.  
But in order to calculate the welfare changes the level form is required in order to 
integrate the function in price and quantity space.  But given the non-linear 
multiplicative nature of the function it means that for the demand curve, as the 
quantity of consumption approaches zero, the price approaches positive infinitely.  
Hence, the non-linear demand curve never actually touches the price axis.  Moreover, 
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the limit of the integral in equation (22) when price tends to positive infinity is again 
positive infinity, so it is not possible to get a definite amount for this part of the 
change in consumer welfare.  To solve this problem, some assumptions are made to 
consider a high price for Iran where the consumption would be expected to be close to 
zero.12 
The estimated ‘overall effect’ is therefore given in the final column of Table 3.  
This shows that increases in GDP, CPI and the trend component have a large effect 
on the change in consumer welfare, more than compensating the negative effect of the 
higher gasoline price.  Furthermore, the change in producer welfare is still positive, 
but somewhat smaller than the positive change in consumer surplus.  However, it 
should be stressed that these results for consumer welfare are only an estimation; 
however they do give a good indication of the direction and approximate relative 
sizes of the change in welfare. 
{Table 3 about here} 
Consequently, for the ‘pure price effect’ results in an estimated social loss 
suggesting that the positive effects of the policy not big enough to compensate for the 
negative effects.  However, this is only the direct effect of the higher gasoline pricing 
                                                 
12
 Due to availability of data and since the UK gasoline market is competitive and prices are market 
determined and generally higher compared to most other competitive gasoline markets in other countries 
(such as the US) due primarily to high taxation rates, UK gasoline price data from 1977 to 2003 weighted 
by gasoline consumption was used as a benchmark.  Data came from the Digest of UK for Energy Statistics 
(DUKES) and www.dti.gov.uk/energy/statistics/publications/prices/tables/page18125.html (table 4.1.2). It 
was assumed that the data is normally distributed, so the upper limit of σ3+P  was used as an upper limit 
of integrals in equation (22) for 
Ng
P  and 
og
P  (where  P  and σ  are the average and standard deviation 
of UK prices respectively).  
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policy, so that when also considering the effects of changes to the other variables, the 
‘overall effect’, estimated social gain is high and positive.  
 
 
4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
In this paper, an attempt has been made to discover the effect on social welfare of 
the gasoline pricing policy in Iran.  This was achieved by firstly estimating a gasoline 
demand function for Iran with an allowance for a stochastic underlying energy demand 
trend by applying the structural time series model.  The preferred gasoline demand model 
includes a local level with drift trend and is inelastic with respect to price both in the 
short and long run, but with the response greater in the long run. 
From this, estimated changes in social welfare were calculated due to a higher 
gasoline price for 2003 and 2004.  Holding all other variables constant, it was shown that 
the estimated effect of only raising the gasoline price results in a reduction in welfare.  
That is, although there are some positive effects from the policy, these are outweighed by 
the negative effects.  However, estimated changes in social welfare when allowing all 
variables in the model to change, is positive due to high positive changes in consumer 
surplus brought about by the rise in GDP, etc. which is shifting the demand curve 
outwards.  This implies that the direct negative effect of an increase in the gasoline price 
for consumer is likely to be more than compensated by increases in these other variables.  
Therefore, given the size of the estimated long-run income elasticity, during a period of 
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growing GDP would appear to be the most advantageous time to introduce the policy of 
higher Iranian gasoline prices. 
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Table 1. Some Gasoline Demand Studies for Iran 
 
Study (year published) Dependent variable Technique/model used Data used Estimated short run elasticities Estimated long run elasticities Other independent variables  Notes 
Total gasoline 
consumption 
OLS/ Dynamic linear  annual  
1966-2000 
=pη - 0.02 
=yη  - 
=pη - 0.4 
=yη  - 
Dummy variable for years 
after revolution in Iran 
Income is not included in 
the equation. Price 
elasticities are calculated 
by us applying the data 
mentioned in paper.  
Gharbali Moghaddam 
and Eghdami (2002) 
Per capita 
consumption of 
gasoline 
OLS/ Dynamic linear annual  
1966-2000 
=pη - 0.11 
=yη  - 
=pη - 0.03 
=yη  - - 
Income is not included in 
the equation. Price 
elasticities are calculated 
by us applying the data 
mentioned in paper. 
Sohfi and Paknejad 
(2001) 
Per capita 
consumption of 
gasoline 
IV/ ECM annual 
1968-2000 
=pη - 0.12 to -0.15 
=yη 0.06 to 0.27 
=pη - 0.59 
=yη 0.95 
- 
The authors have included 
dependent variable lag as 
explanatory variables in 
long run equation. 
Per capita 
consumption of 
gasoline 
OLS/ Dynamic log 
linear 
annual 
1967-1998 
=pη - 0.08 
=yη 0.28 
=pη - 0.62 
=yη 2.15 
- - 
Per capita 
consumption of 
gasoline 
OLS/ Dynamic log 
linear 
annual 
1967-1998 
=pη - 0.14 
=yη 0.45 
=pη - 0.48 
=yη 1.55 
- 
GDP used excludes oil 
sector value added. 
Per capita 
consumption of 
gasoline 
OLS/ Dynamic log 
linear 
annual 
1967-1998 
=pη - 0.08 
=yη 0.45 
=pη - 0.21 
=yη 1.15 
Gasoline vehicles 
- 
Per capita 
consumption of 
gasoline 
OLS/ Dynamic log 
linear 
annual 
1967-1998 
=pη - 0.16 
=yη 0.62 
=pη - 0.62 
=yη 2.38 
Gasoline vehicles  GDP used excludes oil 
sector value added. 
Esmailnia (1999) 
Per capita 
consumption of 
gasoline 
OLS/ Dynamic log 
linear 
annual 
1967-1998 
=pη - 0.09 
=yη 0.59 
=pη - 0.14 
=yη 0.92 
Average age of gasoline 
vehicles 
GDP used excludes oil 
sector value added. 
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Table 1 (continued).  
 
Total gasoline 
consumption 
OLS/ log linear annual 
1974-1995 
=pη - 0.2 
=yη 0.59 
- - - 
Total gasoline 
consumption 
OLS/ Dynamic log 
linear 
annual 
1974-1995 
=pη - 0.1 
=yη 0.48 
=pη - 0.13 
=yη 1.5 
- - 
Total gasoline 
consumption 
OLS/ Dynamic log 
linear 
annual 
1974-1995 
=pη - 0.13 
=yη 0.39 
=pη - 0.21 
=yη 0.65 
Stock of gasoline  vehicles  - 
Total gasoline 
consumption 
OLS/ Dynamic log 
linear 
annual 
1974-1995 
=pη - 0.13 
=yη 0.47 
=pη - 0.19 
=yη 0.71 
Average age of vehicles - 
Average gasoline 
consumption of 
each vehicle 
OLS/ Dynamic log 
linear 
annual 
1974-1995 
=pη -0.2 
=yη 0.38 
=pη -0.28 
=yη 0.58 
Per capita vehicles - 
Akhani (1998) 
Per capita 
consumption of 
gasoline 
OLS/ Dynamic log 
linear 
annual 
1974-1995 
=pη - 0.17 
=yη 0.36 
=pη - 0.28 
=yη 0.6 
Per capita vehicles - 
Note: =pη  Price elasticity, =yη Income elasticity.  
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Table 2: Estimated STSM Gasoline Demand Functions for Iran  
Dependent variable: Gasoline consumption (in logs) - dgq  
VARIABLES 1968-1998 1968-2002 
y  0.32  0.35 
 (3.03) (3.48) 
)1(−dgq  
 0.74  0.72 
 (8.68) (8.91) 
rpg -0.19 -0.18 
 (4.87) (4.99) 
d1983  0.07  0.07 
 (5.15) (5.25) 
d1986 -0.05 -0.05 
 
(3.79) (3.80) 
Long run Elasticities   
Price -0.74 -0.63 
Income  1.25  1.25 
Estimated Variance of Hyperparameters  
Irr (10-5)   0.00   0.00 
Lvl(10-5) 27.93 25.86 
Nature of Trend Local level with drift  Local level with drift  
DIAGNOSTICS   
Equation Residuals   
Std. Error  0.02  0.01 
Normality 0.96 0.51 
r(1)  0.00  0.04 
r(2)  0.15  0.19 
r(3) -0.23 -0.14 
D.W. 1.94 1.91 
Q(7,6) 5.42 5.97 
R2 0.87 0.86 
Auxiliary Residuals   
Irregular   
Skewness  0.00  0.07 
Kurtosis  0.00  0.90 
Normal-BS  0.00  0.97 
Normal-DH  0.95  4.24 
Level   
Skewness  0.04  0.27 
Kurtosis  0.93  0.53 
Normal-BS  0.97  0.80 
Normal-DH  0.59  0.55 
Predictive Failure Tests  
χ
2
(4)  1.92 n/a 
Cusum t(4)  1.06 n/a 
Likelihood Ratio Test  
χ
2
(1) 16.52 18.83 
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Notes for Table 2: 
d
gq , y and rpg represent gasoline consumption, income and the real price of gasoline (all in logs). d 
represent intervention dummies.  
t-statistics are given in parenthesis. 
The restriction imposed for the LR test is the fixed level and fixed slope (conventional model). 
Normality is the Bowman-Shenton  and Doornik-Hansen statistics approximately distributed as 2 )2(χ . 
Skewness and Kurtosis statistics are approximately distributed as 2 )1(χ . 
H(9/11) is the test for heteroscedasticity, approximately distributed as )9,9(F / )11,11(F . 
r(1) to r(4) are the serial correlation coefficients at the 1st to 4th lags respectively, approximately 
distributed at N(0,1/T). 
DW is the Durbin Watson statistic. 
Q(n,6) is the Box-Ljung Q-statistic based on the first n residuals autocorrelation; distributed as 2 )6(χ . 
R2 is the coefficient of determination. 
2
)4(χ  is the post-sample predictive failure test. 
The Cusum t is the test of parameter consistency, approximately distributed as the t-distribution. 
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Table 3: The ‘Pure Price Effect’ and ‘Overall Effect’ 
of a Higher Gasoline Price on Welfare 
(relative changes from 2003 to 2004) 
Percentage shares 
Relative Changes  Title 
Pure Price Effect Overall Effect*                   
Consumer Surplus 
-137.4 +96.3 
Producer Surplus +37.4 +3.7 
Social Loss/Benefit 
-100 +100 
*In order to check the sensitivity of the change in overall welfare estimates 
to the assumptions for PN and PO, a lower price of σ+P  (see footnote 12) 
was also used, but this had no discernable affect in the welfare calculation. 
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Figure 1: Nominal and Real Iranian Gasoline Price 
1968-2002
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Figure 2: Gasoline Production and Consumption 
1968-2002
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Figure 3: The Ratio of Gasoline Production to 
Consumption 1968-2002
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Figure 4: Estimated Underlying Gasoline Demand 
Trend 1968-2002
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